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epistemological theory respects or vindicates deep patterns in commonsense epistemology, it is 
viewed as a benefit of the view. Philosophers typically rely on introspection and anecdotal social 
observation to support their characterizations of commonsense epistemology. But recent experi-
mental research shows that philosophers employing these methods often seriously mischaracter-
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Introduction 
Appeals to ordinary thought and talk are frequent in philosophy. For example, Aristotle claimed 
that a theory of happiness should be evaluated in light of “what is commonly said about it” (Aris-
totle 350BCE, 1098b, 9-11). He judged it improbable that a widely held view would be com-
pletely incorrect (1098b, 28-29). John Locke claimed that a theory of knowledge should be in-
formed by how we ordinarily talk about knowledge (Locke 1690, book 4.11.3-8). Thomas Reid 
claimed, “Philosophy has no other root but the principles of Common Sense,” and that in a con-
test between “Common Sense and Philosophy, the latter will always come off both with dishon-
our and loss” (Reid 1764, p. 19). More recently, J.L. Austin advised that “ordinary language” 
should get “the first word” in philosophical theorizing (Austin 1956, p. 11). And Wilfrid Sellars 
argued that identifying the defining features of ordinary thought — “the manifest image” — is “a 
task of the first importance” for philosophers (Sellars 1963, ch. 1). Other leading philosophers, 
including G.E. Moore and Roderick Chisholm, held common sense and ordinary language in 
similarly high regard (Lemos 2004). 
Many lines of research in contemporary epistemology are based on assumptions about ordi-
nary thought and talk about knowledge — that is, about alleged central tendencies in common-
sense epistemology. In the next section, I review five case studies where epistemologists have 
seriously mischaracterized commonsense epistemology. In the Conclusion, I consider some im-
plications of these findings. Epistemology, as currently practiced, fails in its ambitions and might 
be alienating people from the field. Consequently, standard practice in the field should change. 
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The good news is that the tools for change are already at the field’s disposal. 
Case Studies 
Knowledge and reliability 
Contemporary philosophers nearly unanimously agree that knowledge requires reliability (for 
references, see Turri in press a). On this view, knowledge must be produced by abilities that “will 
or would yield mostly true beliefs” (Alston 1995: 8-9). An enormous amount of work has been 
based on the assumption that knowledge requires reliability (for recent reviews, see Goldman 
2008; Becker 2009). But there are theoretical reasons to expect that knowledge does not require 
reliability (Turri in press a; Turri in press b), and the literature contains surprisingly little explicit 
argumentation for reliabilism about knowledge (hereafter just “reliabilism”). Instead, reliabilists 
typically appeal to commonsense epistemology to support reliabilism. They claim that reliabil-
ism best fits the patterns in “ordinary, intuitive judgments” about knowledge (Dretske 1981, p. 
92; see also p. 249, n. 8), that reliabilism is just “commonsense” (Sosa 1991, p. 100), and that 
our “inclinations” and “intuitions” about knowledge are keyed to reliability (Goldman 1993, p. 
271). 
This “proto-reliabilist hypothesis,” as we might call it, has testable predictions. First and 
foremost, people will not count unreliably produced belief as knowledge. For example, if an abil-
ity produces only ten percent or thirty percent true beliefs, then the beliefs it produces will not be 
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judged knowledge. Second, and closely related, vast and explicit differences in reliability will 
produce large differences in knowledge judgments. 
It is easy to test these predictions: we just need to elicit judgments about simple cases that 
vary how reliably beliefs are formed. When this was done, the results were grim for the proto-
reliabilist hypothesis (Turri in press e). Commonsense fully embraces the possibility of unreli-
able knowledge: rates of unreliable knowledge attribution sometimes reach 90%. Knowledge 
judgments are surprisingly insensitive to information about reliability: people attribute knowl-
edge at similar rates whether the agent gets it right ninety percent of the time or ten percent of 
the time. 
For example, in one study, participants were divided into two groups. They all read a story 
about Alvin, who has been out running errands all day. In the morning, Alvin’s wife told him that 
he should stop at the dry cleaners. On his way home, Alvin stops at the dry cleaners. Participants 
in the unreliable condition were also told that Alvin’s memory is very “unreliable”; participants 
in the reliable condition were told that Alvin’s memory is very “reliable.” That was the only dif-
ference. Participants were then asked whether Alvin knows that he should stop at the dry clean-
ers. In the unreliable condition, participants categorized Alvin as unreliable and 86% of them at-
tributed knowledge; in the reliable condition, participants categorized Alvin as reliable and 88% 
of them attributed knowledge (Turri in press e). Similar results were observed for different cog-
nitive faculties, ways of describing unreliability, and narrative contexts. 
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Knowledge and context 
Epistemic contextualism is the view that the verb “know” is a context sensitive expression. More 
specifically, according to contextualism, in order for us to truthfully say a person “knows” a 
proposition, that person must meet the evidential standard set by our context and, critically, the 
standard changes across contexts. In support of their view, contextualists claim that it best ex-
plains competent speakers’ linguistic behavior in certain situations (Lewis 1996; DeRose 2009; 
Cohen 2013). That is, contextualism has its “basis in ordinary language,” where we allegedly 
find “evidence of the very best type” that the standards of “knowledge” are context sensitive 
(DeRose 2009, p. 48). Contextualism is motivated on the grounds that it is uniquely positioned to 
explain “evident facts about usual and . . . appropriate linguistic behavior” (DeRose 2009, p. 81). 
The most famous way of illustrating the idea involves a pair of cases about a man who 
wants to deposit a check and is deciding whether to wait in a long line at the bank on a Friday 
afternoon, or come back on Saturday morning when the line would be short (DeRose 2009). But 
then the question arises: is this bank actually open tomorrow (Saturday) morning? The man visit-
ed this bank two Saturdays ago and it was open then, but banks do sometimes change their hours. 
In the “low stakes” version of the case, nothing serious hinges on whether he deposits the check 
before the weekend is over, and the man says, “I know that the bank is open tomorrow.” In the 
“high stakes” version of the case, something very serious hinges on whether he deposits the 
check before the weekend is over, and the man says, “I don’t know that the bank is open tomor-
row.” Contextualists claim competent speakers will judge that the man truthfully says he 
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“knows” in the low stakes version, and that the man truthfully says he “doesn’t know” in the 
high stakes version. 
It is an empirical question whether people behave as contextualists predict. Prior work has 
explored this empirical question, with mixed results. Some results seemed inconsistent with con-
textualist predictions (e.g. Buckwalter 2010; Feltz & Zarpentine 2010; Buckwalter 2014; see also 
May, Sinnott-Armstrong, Hull & Zimmerman 2010), but others were consistent with the predic-
tions (e.g. Hansen & Chemla 2013; see also Alexander, Gonnerman & Waterman 2014). Contex-
tualists have made several methodological objections to previous studies, particularly emphasiz-
ing the importance of eliciting metalinguistic judgments about a knowledge statement’s truth 
value and of having the agent say “I know” in the low case and “I don’t know” in the high case 
(DeRose 2009, p. 49, n. 2; DeRose 2011). 
It turns out that, when the cases are tested while respecting those methodological strictures, 
the basic contextualist prediction turns out true: people tend to agree that the agent who says “I 
know” in the low stakes case speaks truthfully, and they tend to agree that the agent who says “I 
don’t know” in the high stakes case speaks truthfully (Turri in press f). Is this result good evi-
dence that “know” is a context-sensitive expression? 
No, it is not good evidence, because simpler alternative explanations immediately suggest 
themselves. On the one hand, across the pair of cases, people might draw different inferences 
about whether the agent satisfies requirements of knowledge that contextualists and non-contex-
tualists alike accept, such as truth, belief, and evidence. For example, people might assume that 
someone who says “I don’t know” is less likely to have the relevant belief, or to have a true be-
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lief, or to have good evidence than someone who says “I do know.” This could lead people to 
judge that the agent knows in the one case but not in the other, which in turn would lead people 
to judge that the one agent truthfully says “I know,” whereas the other agent truthfully says “I 
don’t know.” Contextualists do not accept these alternative explanations. They claim that it is 
“natural” to interpret the agent as equally confident in the low and high stakes cases (DeRose 
2009, pp. 190-3). The claim that “nothing changes” about the quality of the agent’s evidence 
across the cases (Lawlor 2013, p. 81; see also DeRose 2009, p. 2). And some imply that we can 
or will “assume” that the relevant proposition is true in each case (DeRose 2009, p. 2). 
Such interpretations might seem natural to contextualists, but it is an empirical question 
whether the cases are actually interpreted that way. And it is not hard to test the matter: we just 
need to (i) collect judgments about belief, truth, and evidence in the same context as the metalin-
guistic “knowledge” judgments, and (ii) see which judgments differ between low and high condi-
tions. When this was tested, people judged that the low stakes agent is less likely to have the rel-
evant belief, less likely to have a true belief, and less likely to have good evidence than the high 
stakes agent (Turri in press f). Any of or all of these differences could produce the observed pat-
tern of metalinguistic judgments about “knowledge,” even if contextualism about “knows” is 
false. Similar results were observed for another famous pair of low/high cases proposed by con-
textualists (Cohen 1999). 
On the other hand, the low/high cases contain a critical confound. Contextualists note that it 
is important for the agent in the low stakes case to say “I know,” and for the agent in the high 
stakes case say “I don’t know.” As a result, the low/high difference is confounded with the “I 
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know/I don’t know” difference. Thus, an alternative, non-contextualist explanation of the finding 
is that people tend to defer to others’ self-regarding knowledge statements. That is, people might 
simply assume that others are well positioned to report on whether they know a proposition, 
which could produce the pattern. This assumption could lead them to defer to the agent’s self-
regarding knowledge statement. If this deferral hypothesis is true, then we would expect the ob-
served pattern of behavior even if contextualism is false. 
Testing the deferral hypothesis is not difficult. The basic idea is to divide people into two 
groups and have them read the exact same story, except for one small difference: have the agent 
say “I do know” in one story, and “I don’t know” in the other. Do not vary the stakes or anything 
else. When people were tested in this way, people exhibited the exact same pattern noted above: 
they agreed when the person said “I do know,” and they agreed when the person said “I don’t 
know” (Turri in press f). Similar results were observed for another famous pair of low/high cases 
proposed by contextualists (Cohen 1999). 
The critical point here is that the difference between “I do know” and “I don’t know” suf-
fices, all by itself, to produce the pattern that contextualists predict. In other words, deferral is 
enough to produce the principal datum used to motivate contextualism. Varying the stakes is su-
perfluous, as is the hypothesis that “know” is context-sensitive. 
Knowledge and closure 
In its simplest form, the epistemic closure principle states that, necessarily, if you know that P, 
and you know that Q if P, then you also know that Q. Or, at least, you would then be in a position 
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to easily know Q by simple inference. For instance, if you know that your car is parked in the 
parking structure, and you know that your car has not been stolen if it is parked in the structure, 
then you know that your car has not been stolen. The epistemic closure principle is implicated in 
many debates in contemporary epistemology, including debates about skepticism (Stroud 1984), 
the semantics of knowledge attributions (DeRose 1995; Cohen 1999), and the relationship be-
tween knowledge and practical considerations (Hawthorne 2004). 
The epistemic closure principle is not as widely or uncritically accepted as, say, knowledge 
reliabilism, but it is very widely accepted. And, as with knowledge reliabilism, the scarcity and 
weakness of explicit arguments for the epistemic closure principle is surprising (Turri 2015a, 
section 1.2). In defense of the principle, many claim that it is a defining feature of commonsense 
epistemology. Epistemic closure, they claim, is “just a familiar fact about human knowledge, 
something we all recognize and abide by in our thought and talk about knowing things” (Stroud 
1984, pp. 18-19). The principle deserves to be called “axiomatic” (Cohen 1999, p. 69). Theoreti-
cal proposals to abandon closure are “revisionary” and suffer from “deep and wide-ranging” 
“conflict” with our “intuition” (Hawthorne 2004: 36). It is, we are told, “striking” (Hawthorne 
2004: 36) and “startling” (Fumerton 1987) that “some philosophers have gone so far as” to deny 
the principle and, in the process, “blatantly violate” such a “basic and extremely plausible intu-
ition” (Steup 2005). 
For a long time, this extravagant characterization of what “we” find intuitively compelling 
went unchallenged, even by closure’s opponents (e.g. Nozick 1981, pp. 205-6; Dretske 2013, p. 
32). But no serious evidence was ever produced for the claim that closure is a defining feature of 
 !9
commonsense epistemology. And it is a straightforwardly empirical question whether common-
sense exhibits such patterns. 
Testing for a commitment to the epistemic closure principle is not difficult. The basic idea 
is to have people consider simple scenarios and judge whether the agent knows a proposition and 
one of its obvious, trivial implications. For example, consider this simple scenario (inspired by 
Vogel 1990, section 2): 
When Maxwell arrives at work in the morning, he always parks in one of two spots: 
C8 or D8. Half the time he parks in C8, and half the time he parks in D8. Today Max-
well parked in C8. It’s lunchtime at work. Maxwell and his assistant are up in the 
archives room searching for a particular document. Maxwell says, “I might have left 
the document in my car.” The assistant asks, “Mr. Maxwell, is your car parked in 
space C8? It’s not unheard of for cars to be stolen.” Maxwell thinks carefully for a 
moment and then responds, “No, my car has not been stolen. It is parked in C8.” 
Which of the following options best describes Maxwell? 
1. He knows that his car is parked in C8. And he knows that his car has not been 
stolen. 
2. He does not know that his car is parked in C8. But he does know that his car has 
not been stolen. 
3. He knows that his car is parked in C8. But he does not know that his car has not 
been stolen. 
4. He does not know that his car is parked in C8. And he does not know that his car 
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has not been stolen. 
If the epistemic closure principle is a defining feature of commonsense epistemology, then 
then when people consider which option best describes Maxwell, the intuitively best answer will 
not be option 3. Indeed, many philosophers claim that statements like 3 are “abominable,” 
“ridiculous,” and “distinctly repugnant” (DeRose 1995, pp. 27-29; Dretske 2013, p. 31; Sosa 
2004, p. 41). However, when this case was actually tested, nearly two-thirds of people selected 
option 3 as the best option (Turri 2015a, Experiment 3). That is, the strong central tendency was 
to attribute the only combination of knowledge and ignorance inconsistent with the epistemic 
closure principle. Nearly no one selected option 3 as best in a closely matched control condition. 
This same basic pattern persisted across different questioning procedures and narrative contexts 
(Turri 2015a, Experiments 1, 2, 4, 5; Turri 2015b). 
Justification and truth 
Suppose that Maria is a watch collector who owns over ten thousand watches. She cannot keep 
track of all her watches by memory alone, so her accountant maintains a detailed inventory of 
them. Maria knows that the inventory isn’t perfect, but it is extremely accurate. Someone asks 
Maria, “Does your collection contain a 1990 Rolex?” Maria consults the inventory and it says 
that she does have one. And this is just another occasion where the inventory is right. Does 
Maria’s evidence justify her in believing that the collection contains a 1990 Rolex? Now imagine 
a case exactly like the one just described except that it is Mario who collects watches and main-
tains an inventory, and this is one of those rare cases where the inventory is wrong. Does Mario’s 
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evidence justify him in believing that the collection contains a 1990 Rolex? Can the fact that the 
inventory is right in the one case but not the other create a difference in what Maria and Mario 
are justified in believing? 
According to the dominant view in contemporary epistemology — the “truth-insensitive” 
approach to belief evaluation — the answer is a resounding “no.” On this view, Maria and Mario 
are equally justified because they have “exactly the same reasons for believing exactly the same 
thing” (Feldman, 2003, p. 29; see also Conee & Feldman, 2004). Their evidence and justification 
are equivalent across the cases, despite the variation in truth. Focusing on more extravagant ex-
amples, consider a staple of contemporary epistemology, the notorious thought experiment in-
volving a radically deceived “brain-in-a-vat.” Leading epistemologists tell us that it is “beyond 
question at an intuitive level” that such victims are “justified” in their beliefs about their sur-
roundings, just as we are (BonJour, 2003, pp. 185-186). “The intuition” here, we are told, is that 
you and your victimized counterpart in the super-psychologist’s tank have “equally good evi-
dence” for your respective beliefs (Russell, 2001, p. 38; see also Cohen, 1984, pp. 281-2). We 
have an “overpowering inclination to think” that the two of you have equally good evidence 
(Fumerton, 2006, p. 93). 
At least one philosopher has claimed that truth profoundly affects what an agent is justified 
in believing (Sutton, 2007, p. 19; see also Littlejohn, 2013). According to this view, “there are no 
false justified beliefs” because justification requires knowledge, and knowledge requires truth 
(Sutton, 2007, p. 1). This view has been labeled an “extraordinary” and “dissident doctrine” lack-
ing in “intuitive credentials” (Conee, 2007). It deviates from “the usual” and “traditional” ap-
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proach to questions about belief evaluation, according to which there is no connection between 
justification and truth (Chisholm, 1989, p. 76). 
But is it so extraordinary that truth can directly affect whether a belief is justified? Is it rev-
olutionary to propose that false beliefs are not justified or should not be held? Some philosophers 
propose that such views are exactly the opposite of extraordinary or revisionary. The ex-
traordinary and revisionist view, they suggest, is the one cultivated in narrow circles within “the 
professional philosophical community” (Sutton, 2007, p. vii). 
So which view is “intuitive” and “natural,” and which is “extraordinary” and “dissident”? 
Is truth-sensitive epistemology revisionary, or does it accurately reflect our ordinary evaluative 
practices? 
It is easy to test the matter: we just need to elicit judgments about simple cases that vary 
only the truth-value of the relevant proposition. When this was done, the results showed that or-
dinary evaluations of belief are deeply sensitive to truth. When confronted with cases very simi-
lar to the ones about Maria and Mario above, approximately 75% of people judged that the true 
belief was justified, but only approximately 25% of people judged that the false belief was justi-
fied. The same pattern was observed across different narrative contexts and when using different 
normative vocabulary to evaluate belief and evidence (e.g. “rational,” “reasonable,” “Maria 
should believe,” “the responsible thing for Maria to believe is,” “Maria has good evidence to be-
lieve,” and “the evidence justifies Maria in believing”) (Turri in press d, Experiment 1; see also 
Turri in press c, Experiments 1 and 4). Similarly, in a study that asked people to compare the ev-
idence of a normally embodied human and the evidence of his victimized “brain-in-a-vat” twin, 
 !13
nearly 80% of people judged that the normal human’s evidence was better (Turri in press d, Ex-
periment 3). 
Knowledge and near-misses 
For decades epistemologists have claimed that, intuitively, agents in “fake barn” cases lack 
knowledge (e.g. Goldman 1976; Sosa 1991: 238-9; Plantinga 1993, p. 33; Pritchard 2005: 161-2; 
Kvanvig 2008: 274; Pritchard 2014, ch. 6). In a fake barn case, the agent (“Henry” in the origi-
nal) perceives an object (a barn in the original) and this perceptual relation remains intact 
throughout. If that is where the story ended, then we would have no problem saying that the 
agent knows that the object is present. However, it is then revealed, the agent currently inhabits 
an environment filled with numerous fakes (“papier-mâché facsimiles of barns” in the original), 
which look like real ones. Epistemologists tell us that, when this information is revealed, we are 
“strongly inclined” to deny that the agent knows that the object is present. We are then asked, 
“How is this change in our assessment to be explained?” (Goldman 1976, p. 773). 
Any attempt to explain this behavior is idle if the behavior does not occur. And recent re-
search has shown that in fact the behavior does not occur. Instead, people tend to attribute 
knowledge in fake-barn cases (Colaco, Buckwalter, Stich & Machery 2014; Turri in press g). 
More generally in cases where an agent perceives something that makes her belief true and this 
perceptual relation remains intact, people overwhelmingly attribute knowledge, even when 
lookalikes pose a salient threat to the truth of the agent’s belief (Turri, Buckwalter & Blouw 
2014; Turri in press h). Indeed, commonsense views these cases similarly to paradigm instances 
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of knowledge, with rates of knowledge attribution often exceeding 80% and not differing from 
closely matched controls. 
Conclusion 
Appeals to commonsense and ordinary thought and talk are frequent in philosophy, perhaps 
nowhere more than in contemporary epistemology. When an epistemological theory implies seri-
ous error in commonsense epistemology, it is counted as a cost of the view. It is not necessarily a 
prohibitive cost, but it is a cost nonetheless. Similarly, when an epistemological theory respects 
or vindicates deep patterns in commonsense epistemology, it is viewed as a benefit of the view. It 
is not necessarily a conclusive benefit, but it is a benefit nonetheless. 
Standard practice in Anglo-American “analytic” epistemology is to rely on introspection 
and anecdotal social observation to characterize commonsense epistemology. This method has 
led to serious mischaracterizations of commonsense and ordinary practice. Above I reviewed five 
examples of this: knowledge reliabilism, contextualism, the epistemic closure principle, truth-
insensitive theories of justification, and knowledge attributions in “fake barn” cases. In each 
case, the central tendencies in commonsense epistemology are very different from what episte-
mologists have assumed. The implications of this are potentially significant. I will discuss two. 
One implication pertains to how people perceive philosophy. Recently there have been pub-
lic discussions, in The New York Times (Fish 2011) and The Chronicle of Higher Education 
(McIntyre 2011), of whether academic philosophy has any value at all. Extremely successful se-
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nior philosophers question the value of philosophy practiced from the armchair (Glymour 2011; 
Thagard 2012). Many factors probably contribute to negative perceptions of contemporary acad-
emic philosophy. One factor is that people are suspicious of attempts to answer philosophical 
questions from the armchair (Buckwalter & Turri, in press). Indeed, greater prior exposure to 
academic philosophy is associated with more suspicion of armchair philosophical inquiry 
(Buckwalter & Turri, in press, Experiment 2). A second factor might be that people are alienated 
by the verdicts that philosophers treat as obvious or commonsensical. For instance, imagine stu-
dents taking an introductory epistemology course. They are asked to consider a radically de-
ceived “brain-in-a-vat” undergoing experiences qualitatively similar to those of a normal human. 
“The intuition here,” they are told, is that the brain-in-a-vat and normal human are equally justi-
fied in all of their beliefs. This intuition contradicts most people’s judgment about the case, but it 
is treated as a touchstone for constructing and evaluating theories of justification. The same is 
true for “the intuition” that the agent in a “fake barn” case does not have knowledge. Before 
long, some students might conclude that they are not good at philosophy (Buckwalter & Stich 
2014, section 4). But, I suspect, it is equally likely that students will conclude, along with 
Thomas Reid, that if this is how philosophers conduct their business, then philosophy is “justly 
ridiculous” (Reid 1764, p. 21). 
Another implication is methodological. To the extent that epistemologists aim to understand 
the concepts and categories we care about in our ordinary lives — the things which led many of 
us to study philosophy in the first place — then standard practice in contemporary epistemology 
should change. As the case studies reviewed above suggest, it is inadequate for epistemologists 
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to rely only on introspection of their own impressions, the reported impressions of other profes-
sionals, and anecdotal social observation. A few simple controlled experiments can quickly cut 
through mistaken impressions and observations. In short, epistemologists should be quick to rely 
on controlled experiments to separate wheat from chaff. 
This is especially true early in a research program, when results can provide formative clues 
putting researchers on more promising paths. For example, an enormous amount of time and en-
ergy has been devoted to knowledge reliabilism and contextualism over the past few decades. In 
that time, these views went from novelties to standard topics covered in textbooks, handbooks, 
anthologies, encyclopedias, and survey courses. Epistemologists lengthily debated finer details 
of how to understand reliability and the context-sensitivity of knowledge judgments, as well as 
their relationship to other complicated issues in philosophy. But none of these details matters if 
the assumptions initiating the discussion are false. Moving forward, some basic preliminary ex-
periments can help to avoid similar false starts. Would that a false start last a few weeks rather 
than a few decades. 
Philosophers are typically not trained to conduct experiments, so this methodological pro-
posal might seem onerous and impractical. But this concern is addressed by two developments. 
On the one hand, a critical mass of philosophers today can conduct experiments — the experi-
mental philosophers. The number of philosophers fitting this description grows each year. On the 
other hand, interdisciplinary collaboration is increasingly common, and there have always been 
trained scientists interested in philosophical issues and willing to work with philosophers on 
questions of common concern. 
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Nothing I say here implies the illegitimacy of prescriptive epistemology. Epistemologists 
need not be limited to mapping the contours of commonsense epistemology. Instead, they might 
wish to cultivate new and better epistemological concepts and categories. But this cannot sensi-
bly be done in ignorance of commonsense concepts and categories. Indeed, quite the opposite — 
it is silly to prescribe changes unless you understand what you are prescribing changes to! Such 
understanding is required to intelligently evaluate whether your proposed changes would im-
prove people’s performance. In this respect, experimentation is prerequisite to good prescriptive 
epistemology. 
Of course, not every epistemological project need be experimental and not every episte-
mologist need be an experimentalist. That would be boring and dysfunctional. It is enough that 
the field as a whole includes the relevant experimental expertise and brings it to bear in appropri-
ate ways at appropriate junctures. As happens in other fields, researchers will choose a path that 
suits their interests and temperament — some will focus on more purely theoretical or prescrip-
tive projects, others will focus on more descriptive or experimental projects, others will focus on 
applied projects, and others will pursue an eclectic mix. The sooner epistemology evolves in this 
direction, the sooner it will become a more productive, exciting, and respected discipline. Of 
course, this will probably not happen unless practitioners understand and embrace the value of 
doing so. 
In sum, in light of a string of serious and widespread failures in the field, normalizing ex-
perimentation in epistemology is wise. It will help the field avoid unfavorable perceptions and 
help practitioners identify genuinely commonsensical starting points. 
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